A letter to President Obama from Iranians

Category: Government

Region: Iran

Target: Mr Barack Obama

Background (Preamble):

There are new approaches between Iran and USA after 30 years. Iranian government in the latest presidency election rigged the votes and Mr Ahmadinejad came out with fiction percentage of 62.

We all ask Mr Obama not to recognize Mr Ahmadinejad as Iranian president as it seems he got elected like a coup.

US supported Iranian regime in 50s to turn down by a coup. We strongly ask United States not to recognize Mr Ahmadinejad as Iranian President. That would mean that US supported another coup against the democracy in Iran.

Petition:

Dear Mr President Obama,

Your election by American people was not only hope for Americans but also for many people in the world who wanted change in their own societies.

Mr President, Iranian first approach to democracy got down by the coup which your country heavily supported against elected Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mosadegh in 50s. That caused a loop back for the country for about 30 years. Since that time, Americans in most Iranians’ eyes were not those people we had thought of. We consider them as people who just see their own benefits and do not care about anything else.

On June 12th 2009, Iranians overwhelming voted for change as Americans did on November 4th 2008.
But in an unacceptable and unrespectable event, Mr Ahmadinejad came out with 62% as president. We all know and believe that they have rigged the election and as Mr also Mr Mousavi and Mr Karoubi our reformist candidates referred to it as a huge Fraud. So the event which was supposed to burst the country in happiness, it turned out to a national funeral.

We, Iranian people are aware about your new policy about Iran as you have invited Iranian diplomats in all American embassies and foreign offices around the world for 4th of July. The policy that some refer to it as the hot Dog policy. We all embrace your new policy and we all see it as new window for both countries after three decades.

Mr President, we strongly and kindly ask you not to recognize Mr Ahmadinejad as Iranian president and please withdraw your invitation for Iranian diplomats. We all look for a new window; you were hope for all of us so please do not let another American support to another anti-democracy movement in Iran.

Our Kindest regards,

Iranians

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Sexual revolution

This article is taken from Iranian.com.

Excerpt from "Sexual Politics in Modern Iran"

by Janet Afary
27-May-2009

Sexual Politics in Modern Iran
Cambridge University (2009)

Janet Afary is a native of Iran and a leading historian. Her work focuses on gender and sexuality and draws on her experience of growing up in Iran and her involvement with Iranian women of different ages and social strata. These observations, and a wealth of historical documents, form the kernel of this book, which charts the history of the nation's sexual revolution from the nineteenth century to today. What comes across is the extraordinary resilience of the Iranian people, who have drawn on a rich social and cultural heritage to defy the repression and hardship of the Islamist state and its predecessors. It is this resilience, the author concludes, which forms the basis of a sexual revolution taking place in Iran today, one that is promoting reforms in marriage and family laws, and demanding more egalitarian gender and sexual relations.

Excerpt from Chapter 3
Class and Status-Defined Homosexuality and Rituals of Courtship

One of the best-known examples of love and reciprocity in mystic circles appears in an account of the life of Rumi, the greatest Sufi poet in the Persian language, whose followers founded the Mevle known for its ritual whirling. While living in Konya in 1244, Rumi forged an intense bond with Mawlana Shams Tabrizi, a mystic and accomplished teacher who claimed to have reached union with God. Theirs was a unique relationship since both were mature and renowned masters. Franklin Lewis writes that contemporaries defined their relationship as falling in love, which Franklin qualifies as a “Platonic love of a disciple for his teacher.” Rumi took Shams home, “ where they lived happily for a year or two before the disciples of Rumi became to act on their jealousy” (Lewis 2001, 159). Various accounts have suggested that resentful disciples of Rumi stabbed Shams and threw his body into a nearby well. [1] After the disappearance of Shams, Rumi’s mystical poetry continued and gave birth to some of the most beautiful poems in the Persian language. Rumi also used Shams’s name as a pen name in much of his poetry, signaling his unity with his beloved. Rumi had other mystical love relationships and eventually composed the epic poem Mathnavi, which has been called the “Persian Qur’an” (Schimmel 1975, 313–15).

Devotees of Sufi poetry have often denied its earthly and carnal dimensions. They have suggested that Sufi love poems were not literal expressions but symbolic representations of the concealed beauty of the divine. We may never know the true nature of the relationship between Shams and Rumi. We do know that many of their contemporaries considered the lack of a hierarchical relationship between the two most unusual. “They embraced each other and fell at each other’s feet, ‘so that one did not know who was lover and who was beloved.” (Schimmel1975, 313). Rumi celebrated moments when social formalities were abandoned in their lives “How sweet it is when there are no formalities between lover and beloved. All these conventionalities are for strangers, [but for the lover and beloved], whatever is not love is forbidden to them (Cited in Lewis 2001, 181). But Shams lamented the lack of clear boundaries, “I need it to be apparent how our life together is going to be. Is it brotherhood and friendship or shaykh-hood and discipleship? I don’t like this. Teacher to pupil? (Tabrizi 1990 cited in Lewis 2001, 163).

Many admirers of mystical poetry have pointed to the mystics’ break with orthodoxy and their exploration of a more intimate relationship with God. Others have celebrated the Sufi message of tolerance, especially their rejection of socially-imposed boundaries between different religions, and their belief that Jews, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Muslims were all created by God (Nasr 1977, 123). Can the homoeroticism of Persian mystical poetry be viewed as also a definite cultural theme, not just a break with religious orthodoxy, but a departure from the requirements of status-defined homosexuality in mainstream Iranian society?. This is an intriguing question. In this rigidly hierarchical society, as much so as the Greco-Roman world that preceded it, one of the most important social barriers was between the “active” lover and “passive” beloved. Yet it appears that some mystic poets such as Rumi may have aspired to a new and more reciprocal ethic of love within their small communities. When Rumi and his contemporaries insisted that in the most exulted state of love the distinction between the lover and beloved disappeared—noting in the accounts of Rumi and Shams that no one knew “who was lover and who beloved”—they may have been moving beyond status-defined homosexuality, beyond a relationship that always involved an implied “active” lover and a “passive” partner. In ultimate love, then, reciprocity and consent were essential.

* Also see excerpt from Chapter 9

[1] Lewis takes issue with this conventional reading of the disappearance of Shams (Lewis 2001, 187-193).

Vali Nasr, Bridging the gap

Talking with the first Iranian-American appointee of the Obama Administration

by PAAIA from Iranian.com
24-Apr-2009

Before accepting his new position as senior advisor to special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Vali Nasr had already distinguished himself as one of the leading analysts on the Middle East and South Asia, appearing on CNN, ABC, NPR, and lending his expertise to articles in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Time Magazine and Newsweek.

Author of The Shia Revival, Democracy in Iran, and The Islamic Leviathan, Nasr is also a Professor of international politics at Tufts University, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think-tank focusing on foreign policy. He is also a Senior Fellow with The Dubai Initiative of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. PAAIA's Rudi Bakhtiar caught up with Nasr as he prepares for his new role in the Obama Administration.

R: How would you describe your new role in the Obama Administration as senior advisor to Ambassador Holbrooke?

V: I have worked with Ambassador Holbrooke for some time now, most recently during the presidential campaign. I think he is one of America’s most capable diplomats, a man who has the ability to tackle the thorniest issues that confront the U.S. in the Middle East and South Asia. His current mission involves resolving the crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I will be serving as his Senior Advisor in shaping American policy in this conflict in particular by addressing the political dimension of America’s strategy and bringing it into alignment with the overall goals of addressing security concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

R: You lived in Pakistan as a doctoral student and studied Islamist movements there, and have traveled to Pakistan many times since then. How do you believe your experience on the ground in Pakistan will shape your policy advice?

V: I have in addition traveled to Pakistan many times over the past two decades. I have also written extensively, including three books, on Pakistan’s politics, regional role and the role of Islam and extremism in its history. I hope to use that experience and knowledge to inform America’s approach to addressing the current crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

R: What, in your opinion, are the most significant challenges the U.S will face in the South Asia/Afghanistan region in the next ten years, and the biggest opportunities?

V: It is events in Afghanistan that have had the most significant impact on U.S. foreign policy over the past decade. The events of 9/11 and what followed in America’s relations with the Muslim world all had their roots in instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and now almost a decade after 9/11 Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to pose the most serious challenges facing American security and foreign policy. In many ways for America to get past this phase of its involvement in the Middle East and for the region to also turn the page the crisis in Afghanistan has to be solved. But this is a complex problem. Most immediately, the challenge is to contain and end the Taliban insurgency, and the lawlessness that reigns in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But to solve that problem we have to tackle other problems: establishing a viable government in Afghanistan, strengthening the government in Pakistan, addressing economic problems in the two countries, addressing the drug problem in Afghanistan, stabilizing relations between the two countries, changing America’s image in that part of the world, and building lasting partnerships between U.S. and the countries of the region and more important between the countries of the region. There are also other issues such as securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal that have to be tackled. In short, the security problems require making sure Afghanistan and Pakistan become functioning and stable countries in a region with well-defined relations between regional actors.

R: You're well known here in Washington (and around the world) as a Middle East expert, and have been involved in policy-making for some time. How did your career morph from academia to politics?

V: I did not change careers so much as extended the purview of what I was doing beyond scholarly research into policy-making. I have continued to research, write articles and books. In fact I am jut finishing a new book before starting at the State Department. I have also continued with teaching and a good portion of my time over the past five years has been dedicated to working with my students. My involvement in policy-making came in tandem with my academic life. The change rather came in trying to bridge the gap between academia and policy-making worlds. America has some of the world’s leading academic institutions and there is a great deal of knowledge in them about the Middle East and other regions of the world. There are many Iranian-Americans who have excelled in this environment. However, traditionally those in academia have not been connected to those who make decisions about the world. In recent years there has been growing interest in policy-making, media and also general public in deeper understanding of issues relating to the Muslim world in general and places in that region where America has immediate interests. I have tried in my on way and in areas I know about to provide the necessary link between these worlds by addressing the concerns of policy-makers by relating what I know from my own research and writing. I have found great deal of interest in Washington in learning more about the Middle East, and then one thing led to another and I became more involved in policy-making and also talking to media.

R: The focus, in your new position, is solely on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Would you like Iran to eventually also become part of the equation, or is it already?

V: I believe that Iran today plays a pivotal role in the Middle East. Iran’s influence in one form or another is present across a vast region from Lebanon to Afghanistan. Ultimately America’s interests in this broad region as well as in individual arenas of conflict will necessitate contending with Iran. How the Afghanistan crisis turns out will ultimately impact U.S.-Iran relations and in turn how U.S.-Iran relations turn out will impact Afghanistan. So I think at some point there will be a convergence between the various issues the U.S. is dealing with in the Middle East and the future of its relations with Iran.

R: When did you come to the United States and what was that experience like for you?

V: My family migrated to the United States after the revolution; in fact, immediately after the revolution swept Iran. It is an experience that I share with countless other Iranian-Americans. Those early years were a difficult time for me and my family. We left everything behind in Iran and had to start from scratch in a new country; we had to deal with our loss and loss of the many family ties and bonds of friendship we left behind. Life was uncertain and although America was welcoming to all of us who took refuge here, nevertheless the deteriorating image of Iran after the Hostage Crisis was challenging. I remember the difficulties of being an Iranian then at school or working at odd jobs. Abruptly cutting from an environment and a life is always difficult, more so if the problems that pushed you into exile follow you there. But I guess time writes its own verdicts, and thirty years on, like many other Iranian-Americans, I too eventually settled into the rhythm of a new life and came to terms with what 1979 meant for us all. I think I never quite escaped the weight of the tumult that changed our lives as I was drawn to studying Iran and the political movement that changed its history.

R: Favorite Iran memory?

V: I have too many memories of Iran, and sometimes I think perhaps not enough. But what is always in my mind, what comes to my mind when I think of Iran instinctively, is the view of the majestic Alborz mountains looking down on Tehran; that was what I saw first thing every morning out of my room’s window since I can remember and then for so many years after, that is until all of a sudden I didn’t see it anymore.

R: I meet a lot of college students working with PAAIA, and many of them ask me if I know you...and tell me how much they look up to you. For those who want to be where you are some day, what piece of advice can you give them?

V: I am honored and humbled to hear such sentiments. I too am enormously proud of what the young Iranian-Americans have accomplished in this country and continue to accomplish. My first day in the State Department I met young Iranian-Americans working at various jobs as diplomats, foreign service officers and specialists managing this country’s foreign policy—and not on Iran-related topics but on variety of global issues. I cannot think of any other migrant community that has done so much so quickly in America. I doubt that given what the Iranian-American youth are accomplishing in academia, medicine, sciences, media, law, business, arts and now also in politics, that they need any advice. They are doing just fine. Iranians are hard-working by nature, and they value education. Our culture celebrates excellence. I think so long as our youth hold on to these values they will go far and make us, this country and the country their parents came from proud.

R: I know you don't have a lot of down time with three kids and your busy work schedule, but when you do, what do you do for fun?

V: I love to spend quality time with friends and family. I think the measure of a person is the quality of his relationships. When time is scarce family matters more, and I revel in spending time with my children, especially because I am grateful to them for their patience for giving me time to write and do other things. I love to read novels, that is whenever I get a chance, and I also love to travel, provided I get to set foot out of a hotel or conference room. I guess we all have favorite activities, but ultimately what matters is to be productive and to be satisfied with what you do, and doing it well. If by fun we mean a sense of joy and elation that gives color to our lives and lifts us above the grind of daily life I would venture to say that it has to come from within, and that requires a balance between everything we do.

R: You have played a big role in PAAIA as a board member of PAAIA Fund. How important is an organization like this to our community.

V: I think PAAIA is enormously important to us. America is a country of immigrants. Every community that came to this country before us ultimately found a right balance between its original identity and its American identity, and then enshrined that balance in organizations that represent it. It is time for Iranian-Americans to do the same; to properly define themselves for the larger American society, and hold on to the values and identity that matters to them and that they want to pass on to their children. PAAIA plays that critical role. America is also built bottom up by interest groups and grass roots organizations. A community as prosperous and accomplished as the Iranian-American community can only play its proper role in this society if it invests in organizations that can pool its resources and project its voice. As Americans we can all fulfill our potential the best we can, but as Iranian-Americans we cannot get anywhere unless we gel as a community. The wisdom of the Persian saying: “Yek Dast Seda Nadarad (one hand cannot make sound) tells it all. Iranians need one another to be one community, and more so to represent themselves in this vast country. I hope that PAAIA will be a trailblazer in this regard and will chart the way for many more Iranian-American organizations to take form in different fields and with different missions to capture the entirety of the Iranian-American experience and make sure it takes its proper place in American society, politics and culture. Each of us came to this country for a different reason and at a different time, but we all know that something unique binds us together and defines our lives in America. It is quite clear that that something matters to all Iranian-Americans; PAAIA was formed to capture that something and make something more of it, for us, for our children, and for the larger American society. We are here to stay and to make our mark, we know we can do it as individuals now it is time we did it as community.

Happy Norooz, Persian New Year, Year of 2568

In harmony with rebirth of nature, the Persian New Year Celebration, or Norooz, always begins on the first day of spring, March 20th of each year. Norooz ceremonies are symbolic representations of two ancient concepts - the End and Rebirth. About 3000 years ago Persian's major religion was Zoroastrianism, named in honor of its founder Zoroaster, and arguably the world's first monotheistic religion. Zoroastrians had a festival called "Farvardgan" which lasted ten days, and took place at the end of the solar year. It appears that this was a festival of sorrow and mourning , signifying the end of life while the festival of Norooz, at the beginning of spring signified rebirth, and was a time of great joy and celebration. Norooz was officially acknowledged and named "Norooz" by mythical Persian emperor, Shah Jamshid, from Achaemenid Dynasty (500 BC). Achaemenied created the first major empire in the region and built Persepolis complex (Takhte Jamshid) in the city of Shiraz. Norooz in Persian means "New Day" and brings hope, peace and prosperity to the world and has been celebrated among people regardless of ethnic background, political views or religion in many countries around the globe such as Iran, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Iraq, Tajikistan, Syria ,Armenia and India.

Family members, all dressed in their best, sit around the table and eagerly await the announcement of the exact time of vernal equinox over radio or television. The head of the family recites the Norooz prayers, and after the time is announced, each member kisses the other and wishes a Happy Norooz. Elders give gifts to younger members. Next the rounds of visits to neighbors, relatives, and friends begin. Each visit is reciprocated. Zarathushtra’s Birthday and Norooz festival are celebrated by Zartoshtis at social centers on about 6 Farvardin (26 March). Singing and dancing is, more or less for the first, a daily routine. The festivity continues for 12 days, and on the 13th morning, the mass picnic to countryside begins. It is called sizdeh-be-dar, meaning “thirteen-in-the-outdoors.” Cities and villages turn into ghost towns with almost all the inhabitants gone to enjoy the day in woods and mountains along stream and riversides. People sing, dance, and make merry. Girls of marriageable age tie wild grass tops into knots and make a wish that the following Norooz may find them married and carrying their bonny babies.


Haji Firooz is a character who is the traditional herald of the Norooz. Haji Firooz disguise themselves with makeup and wear brightly colored outfits of satin. Haji Firuz sing and dance and parade as a carnival through the streets with tambourines, kettledrums, and trumpets to spread good cheer and the news of the coming new year Norooz.


The Haft Sîn: (from wikipedia.org)
Haft Sîn or the seven 'S's is a major tradition of Norouz. The haft sin table includes seven items specific starting with the letter S. The items symbolically correspond to seven creations and holy immortals protecting them. Originally called Haft Chin , the Haft Sin has evolved over time, but has kept its symbolism. Traditionally, families attempt to set as beautiful a Haft Sîn table as they can, as it is not only of traditional and spiritual value, but also noticed by visitors during Norouzi visitations and is a reflection of their good taste.
The Haft Sin items are:
* sabzeh - wheat, barley or lentil sprouts growing in a dish - symbolizing rebirth
* samanu - a sweet pudding made from wheat germ - symbolizing affluence
* senjed - the dried fruit of the oleaster tree - symbolizing love
* sîr - garlic - symbolizing medicine
* sîb - apples, - symbolizing beauty and health
* somaq - sumac berries - symbolizing (the color of) sunrise
* serkeh - vinegar - symbolizing age and patience

Other items on the table may include:

* traditional Iranian pastries such as baghlava, toot, naan-nokhodchi
* dried nuts, berries and raisins (Aajeel)
* lit candles (enlightenment and happiness)
* a mirror
* decorated eggs, sometimes one for each member of the family (fertility)
* a bowl with goldfish (life, and the sign of Pisces which the sun is leaving)
* a bowl of water with an orange in it (the earth floating in space)
* rose water for its magical cleansing powers
* the national colours, for a patriotic touch
* a holy book (e.g., the Qur'an, Avesta, Kitáb-i-Aqdas, Bible, or Torah) and/or a poetry book (almost always either the Shahnama or the Divan of Hafez)

Israel is a rogue state which is violating over 30 UN Security Council resolutions

Israel is a rogue state. It is violating over 30 UN Security Council resolutions, dating back to 1968, resolutions that require action by Israel and Israel alone [1].

That very important fact is entirely absent from reporting on Palestine by the British and Irish media. If any other state in this world were guilty of such persistent refusal to obey the will of the “international community”, it would be subject to continuous threats of economic and/or military sanctions by the US and the EU – and we would never hear the end of it from the British and Irish media.

The Security Council resolutions being violated by Israel are listed in the Appendix below. For a correspondence with the Israeli Embassy in London on these violations see [2].

Four of the resolutions being violated by Israel are very significant: if Israel chose to take the action demanded in them, the political landscape in Palestine would be transformed. These are:

(1) Resolution 252

This resolution, passed on 21 May 1968, demands that Israel reverse its annexation of East Jerusalem. It states:

[The Security Council]

2. Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

Israel’s failure to comply with this resolution prompted further resolutions – 267 on 3 July 1969, 271 on 15 September 1969 and 298 on 25 September 1971 – demanding the reversal of its annexation of East Jerusalem.

(2) Resolution 446

This resolution, passed on 22 March 1979, demands that Israel cease building Jewish settlements in the territories it has occupied since 1967, including in Jerusalem, and that it remove those it has built. It says:

[The Security Council]

Calls once more upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories;

The Fourth Geneva Convention (on the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War) bans the planting of settlers on territory captured in war. Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Convention says:

“The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

Israel’s failure to comply with this resolution prompted further resolutions – 452 on 20 July 1979 and 465 on 1 March 1980 – demanding that Israel cease colonising the territories it occupied in 1967.

(3) Resolution 487

This resolution, passed on 19 June 1981, was prompted by the Israeli air attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center near Baghdad on 7 June 1981. The resolution “strongly” condemned “the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations” and says that “Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel”.

Crucially, in paragraph 5, the Security Council

“calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards”.

By refusing to allow IAEA oversight of its nuclear facilities, Israel is violating this resolution.

(4) Resolution 497

This resolution, passed on 17 December 1981, demands that Israel reverse its annexation of the Golan Heights, which were captured from Syria in June 1967:

[The Security Council]

1. Decides that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect;

2. Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision;”

It is important to emphasise that these four resolutions (and the others in the Appendix below) place obligations on Israel, and Israel alone. It is therefore within Israel’s power to carry out those obligations without negotiation with the Palestinians or with any other state in the region. It doesn’t need to negotiate with anybody before undoing the annexation of East Jerusalem or of the Golan Heights. Nor does it need to negotiate with anybody before dismantling the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Had it wished to do so, each of these resolutions could have been implemented at the time they were passed by the Security Council, and all could be implemented now, without any process of negotiation.

Resolution 242

In that respect, these resolutions are very different from the well-known resolution 242, the so-called “land for peace” resolution. It requires action by other states and non-state actors, as well as Israel.

Resolution 242 was passed on 22 November 1967, a few months after Israel had acquired large swathes of territory (the West Bank and Gaza plus Sinai and the Golan Heights) by war, contrary to Article 2 of the UN Charter. One might have thought that the Security Council, as the guardian of the UN Charter, would have required Israel to withdraw unconditionally from the territory it had recently acquired by war, contrary to the UN Charter, as Iraq was required to do after it invaded Kuwait in August 1990.

But, in reality, 242 didn’t require Israel to do anything. It merely stated its opinion that “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” should be conditional on the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”. As such, 242 has provided the perfect excuse for Israeli prevarication about withdrawal from the territories it took over by force in 1967, contrary to the UN Charter.

Chapter VI resolutions

Israel has been frequently said that the Security Council resolutions requiring action by it are merely non-binding recommendations that don’t have to be obeyed – because they are all Chapter VI resolutions. For example, in a letter to me the Israeli Embassy in London wrote:

“All Chapter VI resolutions (ones which deal with “Pacific Resolution of Disputes”) can only be implemented through a process of negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration between the parties to a dispute. All UN Security Resolutions concerning Israel fall under this category, and cannot be self-enforced by Israel alone; they all require a negotiating process.” [2]

By contrast, according to Israel, Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq in the past and Iran today, are almost all Chapter VII resolutions and are therefore mandatory. In a sense, this is true since Chapter VI resolutions do not contain enforcement measures, that is, economic or military sanctions, and therefore the chances of Israel obeying them are next to nil.

To give effect to its decisions, the Security Council may impose economic sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter and may authorise the use of military force under Article 42. Both of these Articles are in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and hence resolutions with such enforcement measures are referred to as Chapter VII resolutions. The Security Council has never passed a Chapter VII resolution authorising economic or military sanctions against Israel.

All Chapter VI resolutions non-binding?

So, Israel regards all Chapter VI resolutions as non-binding recommendations that don’t have to be obeyed? Well, no – only those that demand action by it. Israel takes a different view of Chapter VI resolutions that demand action by other states. In particular, it justified its military assault on Lebanon in the summer of 2006 in part because of Lebanon’s failure to implement Security Council resolution 1559, which “calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” [3]

Here’s Dan Gillerman, Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, on the subject, addressing the Security Council on 11 August 2006:

“The way to avoid the crisis between Israel and Lebanon has been clear: implementation of the unconditional obligations set out in resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which set out issues for resolution between Lebanon and Syria. The clear path forward required the disarming and disbanding of Hizbollah and other militias, and the exercise by Lebanon, like any sovereign State, of control and authority over all its territory. But the will to implement this way has been lacking, and over the past month the peoples of Israel and Lebanon have paid a heavy price for that inaction.

“In the face of the failure to ensure that the obligations set out in those resolutions were implemented, Israel has had no choice but to do what Lebanon has failed to do.” [4]

So, according to Dan Gillerman, resolution 1559 (and resolution 1680) contain “unconditional obligations” which Lebanon must obey. 1559 is a Chapter VI resolution (as is 1680). So, applying the Gillerman principle

(1) resolution 252 contains an “unconditional obligation” upon Israel to reverse its annexation of East Jerusalem

(2) resolution 446 contains an “unconditional obligation” upon Israel to cease building Jewish settlements in the territories it occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and to remove those it has built.

(3) resolution 487 contains an “unconditional obligation” upon Israel “urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards”.

(4) resolution 497 contains an “unconditional obligation” upon Israel to reverse its annexation of the Golan Heights

Appendix UN Security Council resolutions being violated by Israel

There follows a list of 32 resolutions being violated by Israel, resolutions which require action by Israel and Israel alone. It is based on an article by Stephen Zunes, entitled United Nations Security Council Resolutions Currently Being Violated by Countries Other than Iraq [5]. It does not include resolutions that were violated for a number of years but have now been implemented, such as those dealing with Israel’s 20-year occupation of southern Lebanon.

252 (21 May 1968)

Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind measures that change the legal status of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and properties thereon.

262 (31 December 1968)

Calls upon Israel to pay compensation to Lebanon for the destruction of airliners at Beirut International Airport.

267 (3 July 1969)

Reiterates the demand that Israel rescind measures seeking to change the legal status of occupied East Jerusalem.

271 (15 September 1969)

Reiterates the demand that Israel rescind measures seeking to change the legal status of occupied East Jerusalem and calls on Israel to scrupulously abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the responsibilities of occupying powers.

298 (25 September 1971)

Reiterates the demand that Israel rescind measures seeking to change the legal status of occupied East Jerusalem.

446 (22 March 1979)

Calls on Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction, and planning of settlements in the territories, occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

452 (20 July 1979)

Reiterates the demand that Israel cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction, and planning of settlements in the territories, occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

465 (1 March 1980)

Reiterates the demand that Israel cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction, and planning of settlements in the territories, occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

471 (5 June 1980)

Demands prosecution of those involved in assassination attempts of West Bank leaders and compensation for damages; reiterates demands to abide by Fourth Geneva Convention.

484 (19 December 1980)

Reiterates request that Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention.

487 (19 June 1981)

Condemns Israel’s attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor and calls upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency.

497 (17 December 1981)

Demands that Israel rescind its decision to annex the Golan Heights.

573 (4 October 1985)

Condemns the Israeli attack on the PLO in Tunisia and calls on Israel to pay compensation for human and material losses from its attack and to refrain from all such attacks or threats of attacks against other nations.

592 (8 December 1986)

Insists Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva Conventions in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories.

605 (22 December 1987)

Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in violations of the provisions of the Convention.

607 (5 January 1988)

Reiterates calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention and to cease its practice of deportations from occupied territories.

608 (14 January 1988)

Reiterates the demand that Israel cease its deportations of Palestinians from the occupied territories.

636 (6 July 1989)

Reiterates the demand that Israel cease its deportations of Palestinians from the occupied territories.

641 (30 August 1989)

Reiterates the demand that Israel cease its deportations of Palestinians from the occupied territories.

672 (12 October 1990)

Reiterates calls for Israel to abide by provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories.

673 (24 October 1990)

Insists that Israel come into compliance with resolution 672.

681 (20 December 1990)

Reiterates call on Israel to abide by Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories.

694 (24 May 1991)

Reiterates that Israel “must refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilian from the occupied territories and ensure the safe and immediate return of all those deported”.

726 (6 January 1992)

Reiterates calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention and to cease its practice of deportations from occupied territories.

799 (18 December 1992)

Reaffirms applicability of Fourth Geneva Convention…to all Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and affirms that deportation of civilians constitutes a contravention of its obligations under the Convention.

904 (18 March 1994)

Calls upon Israel, as the occupying power, to take and implement measures, inter alia, confiscation of arms, with the aim of preventing illegal acts of violence by settlers.

1073 (28 September 1996)

Calls on the safety and security of Palestinian civilians to be ensured.

1322 (7 October 2000)

Calls upon Israel to scrupulously abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the responsibilities of occupying power.

1402 (30 March 2002)

Calls for Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities.

1403 (4 April 2002)

Demands that Israel go through with “the implementation of its resolution 1402, without delay”.

1405 (19 April 2002)

Calls for UN inspectors to investigate civilian deaths during an Israeli assault on the Jenin refugee camp.

1435 (24 September 2002)

Calls on Israel to withdraw to positions of September 2000 and end its military activities in and around Ramallah, including the destruction of security and civilian infrastructure.

Note: Since 1972, the US has used its veto in the Security Council 42 times in order to prevent the passing of resolutions critical. See [6] for details.

David Morrison

23 February 2008

www.david-morrison.org.uk

References:

[1] All UN Security Council resolutions on Palestine can be found at domino.un.org

/UNISPAL.NSF/vCouncilRes

[2] www.david-morrison.org.uk/palestine/israeli-embassy-corr.htm

[3] www.david-morrison.org.uk/scrs/2004-1559.pdf

[4] www.david-morrison.org.uk/scps/20060811.pdf

[5] www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0210unres.html

[6] www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm